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The nature and worth of Michael Oakeshott’s contribution as a political thinker have 
long been the subject of deep disagreement within the community of Anglophone 
political theory. In some circles he remains an important figure who, despite the small 
number of his published works, deserves acclaim as the source of some of the most 
important, philosophically hewn reflections on politics to have emerged in British 
intellectual culture during the last century. 1  And, while the band of those he 
influenced directly through his teaching and scholarship has dwindled quite 
considerably from the point when the ‘Oakeshottians’ represented one of the most 
significant schools within British political theory,2 his work has continued to serve as 
a point of attraction and interest. Most recently he has been claimed as an ally for the 
enterprises pursued by various contemporary theorists, including those seeking to 
delineate a postmodernist trajectory in political theory, and those championing his 
conception of politics as a conversation.3  
 
Other theorists remain skeptical. Quentin Skinner’s judgement expresses the views of 
many – and probably the majority – in the Anglophone community of political theory:  
 
I am fairly confident about several points. One is that Oakeshott’s work was of 
no philosophical influence at all ... He was widely understood as an 
illuminating commentator on Hobbes and I must say I found him virtually 
unreadable on that subject ... Oakeshott seemed a figure of the past and we 
rejected his anti-rationalism and political conservatism outright ... nothing 
                                                   
1 CXX H. Zuckert ed., ‘Political Philosophy in the Twentieth Century’, The Review of Politics 71 (1), 
2009, pp. 1-6 
 
2 Paul Kelly, ‘The Oakeshottians’, in M.Flinders, A.Gamble, C.Hay and M.Kenny, eds., The Oxford 
Handbook of British Politics (Oxford University Press, 2009), pp? 
3 See for instance Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton University Press: 
Princeton, 1980), p.389; M XX Minch- The Democratic Theory of Michael Oakeshott (2009), Imprint 
Academic: Exeter ; and Stephen Gerencser, ‘Voices in Conversation: Philosophy and Politics in the 
Work of Michael Oakeshott, The Jornal of Politics, Vol. 57, No. 3 (Aug., 1995, pp. 724-742) 
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prepared my generation for his apotheosis under Thatcherism, nor the high 
esteem in which his philosophy continues to be widely held.4  
 
This antinomian reception is rooted both in perceptions of Oakeshott’s ideological 
preferences and allegiances and the distance between the nature and focus of his own 
philosophical interests and the dominant trends in Anglophone political theory from 
the 1ate 1970s. But it is also the product of a partial familiarity with Oakeshott’s 
corpus. During his lifetime, his body of published work had a rather slender 
appearance, comprising two major monographs,5 separated by some forty years, and 
two rather more accessible collections of essays on politics and history. His most 
widely read work was the first of these -- Rationalism in Politics (originally published 
in 1962), which included a notable clutch of essays which he wrote in the 1940s. 
Their wide readership resulted in the application of the ideological label Conservative 
to his thinking, and this has undoubtedly had a somewhat distorting effect upon 
perceptions of his intellectual contribution. 
 
Following his death 1990, however, a much larger body of writings, from different 
stages of his life, has become available. And, with their appearance comes the 
opportunity for a more rounded and contextually meaningful appreciation of the 
development and range of his thought. There are now six additional collections of 
essays, reviews and lectures, all compiled and edited with care and skill by Luke O’ 
Sullivan.6 In this same period there has been a notable increase in the number of 
academic treatments of different aspects of his thought. 7  And this welter of 
posthumous publication has done much to create the impetus for the reappraisal of the 
status and import of Oakeshott’s diverse body of writing, and a reassessment of his 
place in the pantheon of British political thinking. 
 
A considerable portion of his intellectual life – including all of the ‘middle years’ 
between the appearance of Experience and its Modes (1933) and On Human Conduct 
(1975) – has been terra incognita for many of his interpreters. And, as a result, it has 
been hard to grasp the relationship between the seemingly disparate ideas set out in 
these different works. But with the publication of his Notebooks we are afforded the 
chance to form a nuanced and informed understanding of how the thinking in them 
interconnected, and to appreciate the range of intellectual influences and political 
preoccupations that characterised his work.  
 
Above all, these private writings offer insight into the mixture of personal, cultural 
and political factors that shaped this extraordinary mind. The idiosyncratic and – 
typically cryptic – jottings and thoughts contained in this volume have been culled 
from an array of journals written between 1922 and 1986. These include his own 
reflections on a host of philosophical issues, topical political and cultural questions 
                                                   
4 Skinner, Q.  ([2001] 2002). ‘On Encountering the Past’, Finnish Yearbook of Political Thought 6, pp. 
32-63, Minerva: Helsinki 
5 Experience and its Modes (details) and On Human Conduct (details). 
6 DAVID: pls add suitable footnote to Fuller here. 
7 There were two “Companion” volumes published in 2012 alone: A Companion to Michael Oakeshott, 
edited by Paul Franco and Leslie Marsh, Pennsylvania State University Press: Pennsylvania, and the 
Cambridge Companion to Michael Oakeshott, edited by Ephraim Podoksik, Cambridge University 
Press: Cambridge. 
 3
and personal preoccupations, intermingled with quotations and passages transcribed 
from other writers, as well as short essays, dreamy asides and a number of heartfelt, 
often narcissistic, musings on the state of his own romantic life. 
The prevailing style is cryptic and, as their editor rightly notes, deliberately aphoristic. 
O’Sullivan indeed contends that they should be placed within a European ‘aphoristic 
tradition’ which tended to regard successful aphorisms as ‘brief, definitive and 
philosophical’, and which incorporated such figures as  Pascal, the Marquis de 
Vauvenargues, Nietzsche and Bradley -- all of who are liberally referenced in the 
Notebooks. 
As well as offering invaluable material for the biographer, these materials supply 
important clues about some of the intellectual threads running throughout Oakeshott’s 
various works, and point to a string of normative commitments which recurred 
throughout his evolving thinking, several of which render him a much harder figure to 
appropriate for those engaged in contemporary normative projects than is typically 
appreciated. The place and persistence of these norms is of particular importance to 
the study of Oakeshott’s own thought given his own repeated insistence upon the 
inadmissibility of normative considerations to the enterprise of theorising about 
politics.   
The Notebooks are striking too for the combination of mood and tone that run 
throughout them. They reveal a rich seam of cultural pessimism intermingled with a 
deep-seated romanticism. Both of these moods infuse the many reflections upon love, 
life, death, morality and Christianity that pepper these writings. Among these, his 
musings on the ontological condition of mortality and the potential for both religion 
and love to help us deal with the limitations that defy dreams of human perfectibility 
are particularly striking. So too is the deep scepticism he manifests towards claims 
advanced in the name of three of the rising forces of the twentieth century -- science, 
materialism and progress. His critical reflections in these areas are saturated with 
references to romantic literature and poetry. As O’Sullivan observes, the Notebooks 
demonstrate that ‘his interest in Romanticism was not purely academic; in his youth 
in particular he treated it as a living tradition which had a major impact on his 
approach to life’.8  
 
It was against this backdrop that the youthful Oakeshott dramatised an 
insurmountable conflict between ‘worldly’ and ‘spiritual’ values. In one of his early 
essays, Religion and the World (1933),9 and also in On Human Conduct, he presented 
questions of belief and purpose as integral aspects of the pursuit of the ‘good’, but 
also as immune to any kind of rational evaluation or objective measurement. 
Questions of meaning and moral conviction were indissolubly connected in his mind 
with an acceptance of what he called the ‘deadliness of doing’.10 This signalled the 
conviction that:  
… the actual conditions of life are always more or less unsatisfactory. This is 
the condition of Mortality - what are we to do about it? A belief in progress 
does not help … We must admit this condition, admit it as the actual essence 
                                                   
8O’Sullivan ed., in Oakeshott 2014, xi  
9 ‘Religion and the World’ [1933] in Religion, Politics and the Moral Life (1993), Editor Timothy 
Fuller, Yale University Press; New Haven & London 
10 Oakeshott, On Human Conduct, 1975, 74. 
 4
& character of human life, & from it we must derive our values: they must be 
the values of mortality.11  
 
There is a restive, angst-ridden, quality, to the early Oakeshott’s reflections on these 
themes, and these are interfused with the rather romantic notion that the cultivation of 
certain kinds of cultural practice offers the best prospect for a deeper understanding of 
the limits of the human condition. Writing in 1928 he enquired: 
How then shall we employ ourselves? What employment is there that will not 
distract us from this purpose to be without a purpose, this accomplishment to 
achieve nothing? No employment can save us. But cookery is better than most 
… here if anywhere is the art which may be practiced for art’s sake: the 
contemporary life.12   
 
The worldly/spiritual duality was one of a succession of dichotomies through which 
he tended to anchor his thinking, and force the ideas of other traditions and 
philosophers into very broadly drawn alternatives. While these varied in their 
terminology and focus, each of these dualities expressed an entrenched dichotomy 
between the modernist notion of the conscious pursuit of pre-determined goals -- an 
endeavor that was bound to lead to disappointment, frustration and futility -- and the 
‘worldly’ embrace of the sensual, the experiential and the contingent. Restated, and 
subtly re-conceptualised, versions of this duality crop up throughout his writing. The 
first appearance of this dichotomous habit can be located in an early essay Work and 
Play,13 where he countered the instrumental pursuit of pre-determined goals – which 
he called ‘work’ -- and the spirit of ‘ludens’, an intuitive embrace of the ethos of 
enjoyment, experience and emotion. The metaphor of ‘play’ was especially important. 
It signalled his commitment to the intrinsic value of experience, as opposed to the pre-
determination of one’s goals and desires, and also the need to submit oneself to an 
external set of rules which provide the necessary conditions for the playing of the 
game. 
 
In On Human Conduct, this abstract dichotomy re-emerged, but was now couched in 
a different philosophical idiom. There he pointed to the intrinsic importance of 
‘adverbial’, non-instrumental rules of conduct and those norms and rules which were 
formed around the pursuit of specific goals. And he established a connection between 
this dichotomy and his very well-known distinction between ‘civil’ and ‘enterprise’ 
association. Distancing himself from liberal understandings of the relationship 
between individual and law which posited the latter as a restraint upon the liberty of 
the citizen, he argued for an adverbial conception of morality in the public realm, and 
a legal code founded upon its principles, as the preconditions for the exercise of 
liberty. The status and implications of this distinction have been queried by a number 
of commentators, including those broadly sympathetic to his ideas.14   
                                                   
11 See 13[16]  
12 See 10[69] 
13 ‘Work and Play’ (1995), First Things 54, pp. 29-33. (It remains unclear exactly when Oakeshott 
wrote this essay, and was released for publication by his literary executor  in 1995).  
 
14 Gray, J. (1993), Post-Liberalism: Studies in Political Thought, Routledge: London Gray, J. ([1986] 
1995), Liberalism, University of Minnesota Press: Minneapolis. Letwin, O. (2011), ‘Are adverbial 
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As well as offering us glimpses of the patterns of thinking which pre-dated and  
prepared the way for some of his later, better known formulations on politics and 
state, The Notebooks confirm the judgement of those scholars – for instance Elizabeth 
Corey, Wendell John Coats Jr.,  Glen Worthington and Timothy Fuller – who have 
stressed the integral importance of religion to his thought. In another early essay, 
Religion and the World (written in 1929 and published in 1993),15 he elaborated the 
principles that in his mind spanned the conventional divides between theology, 
morality and political philosophy. On this occasion he sketched a contrast between 
‘worldly man’ and ‘religious man’, and these ideas undergirded his critique, in the 
1940s, of rationalism and its influence upon politicians and planners. Those who lived 
in the ‘worldly way’, he maintained, directed their lives towards the pursuit of various 
kinds of ‘immanent’ ideals, including those associated with religion. Fulfilment, 
according to this model, was deferred to an unknown and unknowable future, and 
goals pursued only so far as they fitted with this schema, or accomplishments praised  
according to norms that had been stipulated prior to experience itself. But ‘religious 
man’ -- unlike many actual people who pursued religious convictions – did not, he 
insisted, live by deferring satisfaction but was fully immersed in, and open to, 
pleasures and pain associated with experience in the here-and-now, living truly in the 
present. This, he argued, represented ‘…the difference between mere inconsequent 
flitting from one occupation indifferently pursued to the next as lazily followed - the 
present for the sake of the present - & the present for the sake of life, for the sake of 
freedom’. 16  The truly good life, he was convinced, was that associated with the 
unselfconscious libertine, a character who – following conventional usage – he 
typically sketched in the image of the gentlemanly amateur.  
 
The Notebooks offer ample evidence that romantic themes, works and motifs 
underscored this radically individualistic understanding of the self. They show too 
that he was endlessly preoccupied by the figure of the rakish gentleman, a subject 
who was typically presented in the wider culture as emblematic of a disappearing age. 
Oakeshott gave this figure more intellectual depth than many others did, identifying 
origins in Aristotelian thought and sanctifying ‘the gentleman’ as the vehicle of the 
ideal of unfettered individuality.  
 
A handful of commentators have long identified this character as the assumed subject 
of Oakeshottian thought. Shirley Letwin, in her The Gentleman in Trollope,17 long 
ago characterised Oakeshott’s On Human Conduct as an extended effort to formulate 
the morality of the gentleman.  And Steven J. Wulf depicted his ethical preferences as  
‘civilized self-cultivation, personal integrity, restraint from mean endeavors, and a 
                                                                                                                                                 
rules enough?’, Michael Oakeshott Memorial Lecture, LSE, 19th October 2011, downloaded from 
www.michael-oakeshott-association.com, April 5 2014  
 
15 Glenn Worthington, “Michael Oakeshott and the City of God” (2000), Political Theory Vol. 12 No. 
3 (June) pp. 377-398; Wendell John Coats Jr., Oakeshott and his Contemporaries (2000), University of 
Susquehanna Press, Susquehanna; Elizabeth Campbell Corey, Michael Oakeshott on Religion, 
Aesthetics and Politics (2006), University of Missouri: Missouri 
16 SC [15] 
17 Shirley Robin Letwin (1982), The Gentleman in Trollope, p. 276 n., Harvard University Press: 
Harvard 
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nonchalance concerning risk… they neatly fuse several conceptions of the gentleman 
which had long been extolled in [Victorian and Edwardian] British literature and 
school culture’. 18  He also viewed Oakeshott’s fascination with the disappearing 
gentlemanly ideal as closely intertwined with his romantic sensibilities.  
 
Aristotle aside, the gentlemanly amateur was, for Oakeshott, a descendant of the 
Epicurean tradition, and the latter was a surprisingly common point of reference in 
The Notebooks. Thus, an author widely seen as the high priest of twentieth-century 
Conservatism was in fact a strong advocate of a conception of freedom that was 
strongly individualistic, and decidedly libertarian, at least in his early years. The 
enemies of liberty were latter-day stoics, for whom … ‘to despise ambition & to be 
free from the world had become a cult - a negative cult. But with Epicurus it was a 
positive way of life - ‘Live Alone.’ The freedom of the Stoic was an escape: that of 
the Epicurean a fulfilment’.19 
 
The employment of the term ‘religious’ to describe such a moral outlook was 
deliberately paradoxical, but also reflected a very distinctive understanding of religion 
and its purposes. As Robert Grant has shown, Oakeshott did in fact subscribe to a 
broadly Christian outlook during the 1920s, and had a deep interest in theological 
questions and writings.20 But, in the light of The Notebooks, it is clear that depicting 
him as conventionally Christian is also somewhat misleading. As he observed in an 
early Notebook: 
Christianity has rejected the ethical scheme propounded by Jesus. E.g. the 
moral outlook of Jesus would for example have countenanced sexual 
intercourse, but not if it led to children, but not the future.21  
 
What he derived from religion was not a commitment to the promise of a realm of 
unconditional freedom, but the injunction to live and enjoy life in the contradictory 
complexity of the present: 
That is what is wrong: life lived for “what comes after” understood as what we 
have earned here and made the ideal of a consequential moral and religious 
life. What matters is here and now. Death is the most important event in life, 
but because of what it ends, not what it may begin. A religion dominated by 
the notion of “salvation” is corrupt (& unchristian) as a morality dominated by 
the natural or penal consequences of ill-doing.22 
 
This profound objection to the metaphysical idea of a realm of emancipation, which, 
once attained, would save those virtuous souls who understood its promise, suggests 
an important overlap between his ethical, theological and political sensibilities. A 
very similar objection informed his scepticism towards those political philosophies 
that were animated by the dream of establishing heaven-on-earth, and which he – and 
other conservative European intellectuals in the middle of the twentieth century -- 
regarded as harbouring a latently totalitarian potential.  
                                                   
18 Wulf, S. J. (2007), ‘Oakeshott’s Politics for Gentlemen’, The Review of Politics 69  (2), pp. 244-272 
19 11 [41] 
20 Robert Grant (2012), ‘The Pursuit of Intimacy, or Rationalism in Love’, in Franco and Marsh, eds., 
op. cit., n. 2. 
21 10 [56] 
22 21 [24] 
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Intimately bound up with his various reflections on mortality and religion in The 
Notebooks is a consistent interest in the philosophical and moral implications of love.  
In 1922 he observed that ‘in love our existence is made intelligible. For in love all 
contraries are reconciled’.23  The experience of loving or being in love created the 
ultimately unfulfilled promise of some resolution of the foundational paradoxes and 
fallibilities of human existence. But love, like play, was only meaningful if embraced 
and lived as an end in its own right. It represented one of the vital ingredients of the 
outlook of the ‘religious man’, he declared in 1933, along with friendship and 
contemplation. What he abhorred from an early stage was the tendency to regard 
these qualities through the lens of instrumental satisfaction – as a means to the various 
ends that the modern age enshrined.   
 
Doggedly faithful to his romantic roots, Oakeshott can be placed among a larger band 
of mid-century British intellectuals -- some with very different political sympathies to 
his own -- who believed that it was in poetry, not the prose of the technician or 
politician, that the intrinsic importance of friendship and love could be grasped: 
‘loving is not “doing good”; it is not a duty; it is emancipated from having to approve 
or disapprove ... what is communicated and enjoyed is not an array of emotions - 
affection, tenderness, concern, fear, elation etc. - but the uniqueness of a self’.24 On 
this theme he filled up eleven separate notebooks – all of which are reproduced here –
between 1928 and 1934. These are named after Keats’s poem “La Belle Dame Sans 
Merci”. In these jottings the young Oakeshott intersperses high-flown observations 
about the nature of love and loss with narcissistic complaints about his girlfriend, 
Céline, and howls of thinly veiled sexual frustration.  These passages are unlikely to 
find favour among many contemporary interpreters, and their amoral and 
misogynistic aspects may well make some of his current advocates reconsider their 
allegiances to him. But they also provide a fascinating insight into the different 
domains – the personal, the philosophical and the aesthetic –  where Oakeshott was 
willing to explore the nature and implications of the distinctive combination of 
philosophical scepticism and romantic individualism which united and defined his 
intellectual and personal sensibilities. 
 
The overall picture that emerges of the author of these reflections is of a complex 
figure who looks, for the most part, much more like a libertarian individualist than a 
Burkean conservative. The individualistic ethos to which he subscribed was 
recurrently depicted through positive references to the ‘manly’ values associated with 
the gentleman, including ‘… “physical” courage, nerve, respect for tradition & 
contempt for convention, a proud sense of personal honour, an indifference to 
death’. 25  These he characterised as the moral outlook of ‘… an aristocrat’, 26  an 
embodiment of ‘the standard of Hellenic Life and Culture’.27  His thinking on this 
score was derived from a scattergun of different sources, including the writings of 
Pascal and Montaigne on integrity and probity. Among his contemporaries, the artist 
                                                   
23 01 [50] 
24 ‘The voice of poetry in the conversation of mankind’ (1959), in Rationalism in Politics’ op. cit., n.3, 
p. 537 
25 ([20]11, April 1967) 
26 20 [11] 
27 AR2 [44] 
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who came closest to this outlook was D.H. Lawrence, whose novels include 
characters, Oakeshott observed, who ‘… follow no calling or trade, … are not 
concerned to eat & drink, they make no money - but they live’.28  The literary culture 
of his early adulthood may well have served as a more important source of intellectual 
influence and inspiration for him than the idealist philosophical tradition with which 
he has routinely been associated.  
 
Among the masculine virtues which are hymned in The Notebooks, courage was 
especially prominent. And in these private writings he explores one particular 
exemplar – Admiral Nelson (whose biography he appears to have considered writing) 
– in some depth.29 Nelson, he announces,  was not driven by ‘exterior success’ or 
‘tangible ends’ but by ‘interior success’ - ‘honour’, ‘reputation’, ‘fame’.30 And he 
approvingly notes Aristotle’s claim that ‘courage is no mere matter of discipline, but 
is an energy of the individual soul - a quality of character’.31  Courage is lauded in 
stark opposition to the ‘safety-first’ attitude which he regards as the principle of 
loving which modernity enshrines, one which is fit merely for ‘getting off a bus!’.32  
 
Appreciating the extent of the romantic influence upon him helps explain the 
difficulty of aligning Oakeshott with any single ideological perspective. Indeed The 
Notebooks lend support to the interpretive argument that his work can in some ways 
be read as an elegiac hymn to a way of life that was fast disappearing. In one sense 
this judgment suggests a line of connection between his thinking and ostensibly 
conservative political sentiments – and it is notable that at various points he depicts 
the British Conservative party as the political force most congruent with his own 
outlook.33  But, for the most part, politicians from the political right were, he thought, 
just as likely to embody the kinds of utilitarian and progressivist sentiments which he 
regarded as increasingly hegemonic, and as liable to drive to the margins the kinds of 
cultural ethos and character which he favoured.  
 
He directed particular enmity towards trends in the culture and society around him, 
more than he did to any particular political opponent or ideology. An important essay 
penned towards the end of the 1970s -- The Tower of Babel34 – reveals that the 
                                                   
28  BD5 [02-04] 
29 Horatio, 1st Viscount Nelson, KB (1758-1805), one of Oakeshott’s great heroes, died in action at the 
Battle of Trafalgar, 21st October 1805. Among Oakeshott’s planned but unrealized projects was a 
biography of Nelson (see Oakeshott [1947] 2014, at loc. 8802 (Kindle edition). 
30 NE [06] 
31 AR2 [14] 
32 AR 2 [15] 
33 (Oakeshott [1978] 2008, 281-282).  
‘A state is understood as persons associated, not in respect of their interests and of the substantive 
satisfactions they may choose to seek transactionally or co-operatively among themselves, but in 
respect of their acknowledgment of the authority of certain non-instrumental conditions of conduct…. 
Such a view of the office of government, which owes more to the Whigs than the Tories, is deeply 
embedded in our constitutional arrangements … but if it now has a home anywhere in our politics it is 
surely in the Conservative party …. Mrs Thatcher seems more of a genuine Conservative than her 
predecessors’ ( 281-282, italics added).  The Vocabulary of a Modern European State ([1978] 2008), 
Imprint Academic: Exeter.  
34 There are two essays entitled ‘The Tower of Babel’. The first was originally published in 1948 and is 
included in Rationalism in Politics, op. cit., n.3. The second dates from 1979 and is included in 
Oakeshott, On History and Other Essays, Liberty Fund: Indianapolis. 
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creeping melancholy which is apparent throughout The Notebooks had begun to 
crystallise into a gloomy sense of defeat. As Noel O’Sullivan has observed, 
‘…everything he came to value in education, social life and the politics of civil 
association was unlikely to endure for much longer in an age which has become 
almost completely devoid of any sense of play’.35 The instrumentalism which had 
infused public education, at both secondary and University levels, was caustically 
rejected, in a discussion that reprised his observations on Universities in his 
celebrated essay –  
Start here  
 
XX: ‘For centuries … “Education” has meant a release from the current vulgarities of 
the world … Now education is merely instruction in the current vulgarities’.36 The 
degradation of education was symptomatic of a deeper and wider loss:  
Education now. The whole force and pressure of the contemporary western 
world is against education. It is a world of violent stimuli - film, radio, 
newspapers, magazines - and a mind early adapted to these stimuli will be a 
mind so much less capable of suffering that slow permeation of the personality 
that is characteristic of great literature. The world once, undesignedly, offered 
no positive opposition to this: the walk to school, the relatively slow moving 
days, long days without movement, time for enjoyment, time for recollection, 
time for doing nothing.37 
 
The Notebooks reflect the workings of a highly individualistic, romantic and 
pessimistic mind that was growing increasingly disillusioned with the pattern and 
pace of twentieth-century life. 38   As early as the 1930s, his observations on the 
cultural growing import of science and technology were unremittingly negative, and 
sometimes vituperative: ‘Rape is the typical crime of modern politics; politicians rape 
their victims, rulers rape their subjects; technology is the rape of the earth’.39   This 
outlook underpinned the well-known critique of rationalism as a doctrine which he 
expressed in the 1940s: 
… if the scientist were to perish along with the civilization he has created, 
nobody could regret this loss. No, my view of the menace of the scientist is 
more profoundly shocking than this … the science ridden civilization is a 
menace to civilized life. Worse than a menace; it has already removed from 
mankind both the hope & the desire for a civilized mode of existence … the 
scientist does not keep himself to himself - he is an evangelist, a preacher with 
a gospel that is anything but good news … it has created a civilization which 
is a menace to civilized life … the price we have paid for allowing the 
scientist to do what he likes with the world is a civilization based on false 
hopes, desires & values: a radical perversion of human life.40   
 
                                                   
35  ‘Why read Oakeshott?’, a presentation to the inaugural conference of the Michael Oakeshott 
Association at the LSE, 3-5 September 2001. 
36 17 [66] 
37 CV [37] 
38 13 [78] 
39 17 [72] 
40 13 [B] 
 10
In some moods, this rejection of scientism amounted to a blimpish rejection of 
scientific advance in all its forms: ‘the inventions of “science” - what do people want 
with all this electricity rushing up & down the country - telephone & telegraph’.41 
Along similar lines he privately seethed about the ‘the indescribable vulgarity of 
“Sergeant Pepper”’.42  
 
Some of these observations and reflections reflect sentiments which rarely surfaced in 
his philosophical writings, and need to be treated carefully on that basis. But there are 
many different connections between the material in The Notebooks and the works that 
he did publish in these years, and these are suggestive of important intellectual 
overlaps between these works. This volume includes various versions of his essays, 
for instance, as well as passages that are close in content and tone to essays that 
appeared in print. One of these – A Conversation (which he wrote in 1944) – offers an 
early indication of his feel for one of the most distinctive metaphors with which 
Oakeshott is associated – the idea of politics as a conversation. In this work he 
depicted the political as a civilised and structured set of interactions taking place 
within an established set of rules, rather than – as his ideological opponents insisted – 
a set of practices and institutions that should be subordinated to particular moral 
goals. 
 
But, while it is possible to see the genesis of aspects of his thinking in such writings, 
it is also striking that some of the key concepts with which he is most associated are 
rather notable by their absence from these private reflections – most strikingly the 
concept of ‘civil association’ which appears only twice in the seven decades that this 
collection covers. Whether this signals that its importance has been overstated in 
commentary upon his work is an interpretive question of some import. And it is 
noteworthy too that Hobbes – with whom he is identified as a result of his book on 
him – figures hardly at all.43 Nietzsche, however, is present throughout.  
 
But while the concept of civil association may be absent, the pattern of thinking to 
which it fits is very much present throughout these writings. There is a clear, on-going 
concern to delineate politics as a set of procedures, institutional rules and non-
coercive laws that set the terms for the peaceful co-existence of citizens pursuing 
different, and irreconcilable, moral goals. What these writings also show is that this 
perspective bumped along with a sceptical – sometimes anti-political – take upon the 
actual practice of politics and politicians: ‘politics are an inferior form of human 
activity to anyone who has no desire to rule others’,44 and ‘politics is a suitable 
subject of conversation - indeed perhaps that is all it is suitable for’.45   
 
What is also apparent here is that one of the sources of such judgements was 
Oakeshott’s enduring, Edwardian unease about the advent of mass democracy. ‘The 
people’ are very rarely invoked in a positive manner in relation to the politics of his 
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age. As he put it in 1955, the nature of democratic politics ‘is what makes democracy 
difficult. Not only or not so much, the stupidity of the mass, but their superstition’.46 
This powerful seam of pessimism about the participative dimension of democratic 
politics needs to brought into plain sight for those debating his relevance, and 
considered along with those features of his thought that continue to appeal today.  
 
Quite frequently – as for instance in his  essay The Masses in Representative 
Democracy47 --  he depicts ‘mass man’ as an archetype who stands in stark contrast 
with the spirit and ethos of the rugged individualist, the courageous gentleman. But 
Oakeshott knew all too well that the conditions in which the latter could thrive were 
disappearing as he wrote, and so the alternative individualist ideal which he lauded 
was freighted with a deep sense of elegy and loss.  
 
These various ideas constituted the platform upon which his own, highly distinctive, 
understanding of the political took shape. Politics, he argued in the most cautious of 
terms, needed to be understood within its own limits, and insulated from moral 
visions and ideological programmes that threatened to jeopardise its constitutive 
features. And it needed to be preserved, above all, from hubristic theories that 
regarded it as the vehicle for the realization of some ulterior purpose. In the wake of 
the publication of this extraordinary and difficult medley of writings, we are provided 
with the opportunity to glimpse the range of cultural influences and intellectual 
sources which flowed into the political thinking of this most English of philosophical 
minds. 
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